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Abstract 
We exploit the exogenous change in marginal tax rates created by the Russian flat tax reform of 
2001 to identify the effect of taxes on labor supply of males and females.  We apply the weighted 
difference-in-difference regression approach and instrumental variables to the labor supply 
function estimated on individual panel data.  The mean regression results indicate that the tax 
reform led to a statistically significant increase in male hours of work but had no effect on that of 
females.  However, we find a positive response to tax changes at both tails of the female hour 
distribution.  We also find that the reform increased the probability of finding a job among both 
males and females.  Despite significant variation in individual responses, the aggregate labor 
supply elasticities are trivial and suggest that reform-induced changes in labor supply were an 
unlikely explanation for the amplified personal income tax revenues that followed the reform. 
 
Keywords:  labor supply, personal income tax, flat tax, labor supply elasticity, difference-in-
difference, regression discontinuity, wage endogeneity, employment participation, Russia, 
transition. 
 
JEL classification: H3, J2, J3, P2 
 
Acknowledgement:  We thank Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Barry Hirsch and participants at the 
Society of Labor Economists Meetings in Boston for useful comments. 
 
* ecodrdx@langate.gsu.edu, Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State 
University, PO Box 3992, Atlanta, GA 30302-3992, phone (404)-413-0239, fax (404) 413-0145. 
** Corresponding author, kpeter@gsu.edu, Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, 
Georgia State University, PO Box 3992, Atlanta, GA 30302-3992, phone (404)-413-0165, fax (404) 413-0145. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
Although the classical flat tax - as described by Hall and Rabushka (2007) - has not been 
implemented in any country to date, a number of countries have chosen recently to tax individual 
income at flat rates.1  As of January 1, 2009, the flat personal income tax (PIT) rate schedule was 
implemented by 24 countries, 20 of which are formerly centrally-planned economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.2  A flat tax reform of this nature is usually motivated by a 
number of reasons.  For example, a flat rate tax simplifies income taxation considerably.  Such 
simplification along with lower rates is expected to lower compliance cost for both the taxpayer 
as well as tax administrators (Slemrod 1992).  Lower compliance cost and lower tax rates could 
potentially reduce evasion, income shifting, and other avoidance activities.3  A flat tax reform is 
also motivated by the desire to stimulate the economy via higher work effort and investment 
(Hall and Rabushka 2007).   
The most popular of these flat tax reforms is the flat PIT rate that came into effect on 
January 1st 2001 in Russia.  Much of the attention received by the Russian reform was due to the 
dramatic increase in Russia’s PIT revenue following the reform.  According to Ivanova, Keen, 
and Klemm (hereafter IKK 2005), real PIT revenue increased by 26 percent in 2001 and 
continued to grow in subsequent years.  From a theoretical perspective, lowering tax rates will 
affect PIT revenues via two channels.  The first is a direct channel resulting from the lower rates, 
                                                 
1 Unlike the classical flat tax, countries often apply different rates to corporate income, dividends, capital gains, and 
other sources of income.  The common presence of deductions and exemptions also means that the tax is not 
proportional.   
2 These countries are Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Iraq, 
Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Poland, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Serbia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Ukraine.  Several more countries are 
seriously considering the implementation of the flat PIT rate, e.g., Greece, Hungary, Moldova, and Panama, among 
others. 
3 Both empirical and theoretical evidence on the link between tax rates and evasion is mixed.  However, a majority 
of the empirical literature find a positive relationship between tax rates and evasion with recent theoretical support 
for these results provided by Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007). 
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which in this case would mean lower tax revenues.  The second is the indirect effect on the 
various components of the tax base due to behavioral responses of individuals to lower rates and 
other incentives implied by the tax reform.4  If the second effect dominates, then the tax reform 
could, in principle, expand the tax base and produce strong revenue performance.     
The conclusion that the flat rate expanded the tax base sufficiently to explain the revenue 
growth has been greeted with much skepticism (Gaddy and Gale 2005 and IKK 2005).  IKK 
(2005), for example, find no evidence that the reform is responsible for the increase in PIT 
revenue.  They also argue that while compliance did increase as a result of the reform, it is not 
clear whether the lower PIT rate or stricter enforcement should be given the credit.  A more 
definite conclusion is reached by Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sabirianova Peter 
(hereafter GMP 2009) who show that a significant proportion of the increased compliance is due 
to the lower PIT rate.5  Besides PIT revenue collections and compliance, the Russian reform has 
been used to estimate the effect of tax changes on gross declared income (IKK find a negative 
effect) and net of tax reported earnings (Martinez-Vazquez et al (2006) find a positive effect).  
Both IKK (2005) and GMP (2009) also examine the real side effects of the reform and find little 
or no response.6  While the existing evidence has been solid on the compliance and reporting 
effects of the reform, we believe there is more to be done on the real side responses.   
The purpose of this study is to examine, in a careful and methodological manner, the 
effect of the Russian tax reform on several dimensions of labor supply, including hours of work, 
                                                 
4 It has been shown that there are multiple dimensions along which individuals can respond to changes in the tax 
rates.  They fall into two broad categories: (1) the productivity responses that change the amount of resources 
available in the economy, including the responses of working hours, employment participation, efforts, job 
reallocation, etc.; (2) the responses that redistribute the existing resources between various accounts via evasion, 
income shifting, and other avoidance activities (Slemrod 1992, Feldstein 1995, GMP 2009).   
5 GMP (2009) find that approximately 40 percent of increased reported income relative to consumption can be 
explained by improved voluntary compliance in response to tax changes, while the remaining part is attributed to 
other reasons, including better tax enforcement, credit market development, macroeconomic improvements, etc.   
6 IKK (2005) do not find any positive effect of the tax reform on hours of work.  GMP (2009) estimate the real 
productivity effect at the household level using consumption data and find a very small response (0-4% increase).   
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employment participation, and multiple job holding.  Given that IKK (2005) find negative or 
zero effect on hours and GMP (2009) find little productivity effect, it is natural to ask why look 
at this question again.  We believe there are several reasons for taking another look at the labor 
supply response.  First, the small aggregate productivity effect at the household level can veil 
significant labor supply effects at the individual level.  The consumption-based estimates 
combine all productivity responses that may or may not have changed in the same direction.   
The fact that the estimates are based on household level data also implies that the total 
productivity effect may be hiding opposing effects on individual members of a given household.7  
Second, the aggregate estimates of the effect of lower tax rates on hours of work as in 
IKK (2005) may conceal considerable variation in how hours responded by gender, job type, 
income group, and other individual characteristics.  For example, we find significant differences 
in labor supply response between males and females at the mean and other points of the hour 
distribution.  We also think that it is important to look at the extensive margins of labor supply 
response that have not been examined in previous studies of the Russian flat tax reform.  We find 
evidence that individuals responded to tax changes along extensive margins such as job finding 
and multiple job holding. 
Third, IKK (2005) focus on the short-term effects of the flat tax reform, as they use only 
two years of pre- and post-reform data (2000 and 2001).  With more longitudinal data being 
collected, it is important to look at the medium- to long-term effects of the reform on labor 
supply.  We use panel data for two pre-reform years (1998 and 2000) and five post-reform years 
(2001-2005) and find the response being larger over the longer time span.   
                                                 
7 For example, one member of the household may have increased hours of work and income while the other worked 
less (or work the same hours as before the reform).  If these effects are relatively the same so that they cancel each 
other, then GMP’s conclusion that productivity effects are small, while accurate on aggregate, would be hiding 
significant variation. 
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Finally, there is significant room for improvement of estimates on the methodological 
front.  Although IKK (2005) is the first and only previous study to estimate the treatment effect 
of the Russian tax reform on hours of work, their estimates represent a simple mean difference in 
hours between the treatment and control groups.  We re-examine their estimates by using the 
fully specified labor supply function,8 addressing the issues of tax and wage endogeneity, 
providing more robustness checks, and applying some of the methodological innovations 
proposed by GMP (2009) in defining the treatment group and using the regression discontinuity 
(RD)-type approach. 
We identify the labor supply effect using the flat tax reform as a natural experiment.  The 
tax reform eliminated the two top PIT rates replacing them with the bottom rate.  This implies 
that individuals in the top two brackets saw their marginal tax rate fall in the post reform period.  
We define this change in the tax rate as treatment and estimate the impact of the reform on the 
labor supply of the treated using difference in difference (DID) and RD-type techniques.9  In our 
identification process, we take advantage of the flat tax rate.  The fact that all taxpayers face the 
same marginal tax rate after the reform regardless of income and irrespective of hours of work 
allows us to escape much of the tax endogeneity issues present in previous labor supply studies.   
Estimation is done using micro panel data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey (RLMS).  Two alternative strategies are used to deal with the endogeneity of wages.  The 
first approach estimates a reduced form labor supply equation derived from a simultaneous 
system of labor supply and demand while the second relies on labor demand shifters as 
instruments for wages.  Our estimates show that aggregate results hide important variation across 
                                                 
8 Our estimated labor supply function includes wages, non-labor income, individual and job characteristics, demand 
shifters, individual fixed effects, and clustered standard errors. 
9 Previous studies of labor supply in other countries applied the DID method in environments that still maintain 
graduated tax rates (e.g., Eissa and Liebman, 1996).  We know of no study that used the RD-type approach in 
assessing the effect of tax changes on labor supply. 
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individual groups, especially by gender.  Specifically, we find that the reform had a positive and 
statistically significant effect on male labor supply; males increased their monthly labor hours - 
actual and usual - by approximately 4–6% following the reform with an implied elasticity of 
approximately 0.1–0.15.  Though quite small, these estimates are within the ball park of male 
labor supply elasticities (Meghir and Phillips 2008).  At the same time, we do not find that 
females’ average hours of work - actual or usual - responded to the tax reform.  However, the 
zero response does not stay constant over the hour distribution.  In fact, there is evidence of a 
positive response to lower tax rates at the bottom and very top of the female distribution of 
hours.  Despite significant variation in individual responses, the aggregate response confirms that 
the labor supply component of the tax base did not contribute to the increased PIT revenue.   
Apart from allowing us to quantify the role played by the labor supply component of the 
tax base in explaining the increase in PIT revenue, the estimated labor supply elasticities with 
respect to tax rates are useful for other purposes.  Knowledge of the labor supply response is 
critical for policies such as means tested welfare benefits that depend on how much labor supply 
responds to incentives.  Labor supply estimates also play an important role in general 
equilibrium macroeconomic analyses that seek to understand how policies – not necessarily taxes 
– affect economic aggregates.  Additionally, most labor supply results exist for developed 
countries with mature labor markets.  Since these results may not apply to transition countries 
whose labor markets are yet to reach full maturity, direct estimates of the labor supply response - 
for the largest transition economy - should be informative to the economics profession.  A better 
understanding of the reform’s impact on the labor supply component of the tax base should also 
prove useful to other countries trying to emulate the Russian tax reform. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
implications of the Russian tax reform.  Our identification strategy is described in section 3 
followed by a discussion of the data in Section 4.   We present the results in section 5 and draw 
some conclusions in section 6. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
In this section, we briefly describe the Russian tax structure and discuss the effects the 
reform likely had on labor supply using a static labor supply model.  Like many other countries, 
Russia had a graduated personal income tax schedule before 2001.  The tax schedule was 
progressive with both the marginal and average tax rates increasing with declared income.  In 
one of the boldest tax reforms of the 21st century, the graduated schedule was replaced by a flat 
PIT rate schedule in 2001.10  The significance of the reform was later amplified by the dramatic 
increase in PIT revenue that followed.  This made the Russian flat PIT popular among other 
countries seeking to boost their tax revenue.   
The important research question we are interested in is to what extent the increased tax 
revenue followed the reform is attributed to changes in the labor supply dimension of the tax 
base.  The reform represents a reduction in marginal tax rates which fits neatly into classic 
models of labor supply with taxes.  Since there is nothing novel about the theoretical model, we 
leave out algebraic expressions and present a simple discussion of the incentives created by the 
reform.  Comparative static results find that the marginal tax rate has an ambiguous effect on 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that the new tax schedule is not a pure flat tax as outlined in Hall and Rabushka (2007).  For 
example, the new tax structure preserves deductions and applies different rates to dividends and interest income.  
IKK (2005) discuss in greater detail the different changes that were implemented during the reform.  One of those 
changes that we consider in Section 5 is the unified social tax paid by employers.  Specifically, the reform unified all 
employer contributions to the social security funds (pensions, social insurance, and medical insurance) into a social 
tax and cut the existing flat rate from 38.5 percent, when all contributions were added together, to a regressive scale 
with 35.6 percent for income below 100,000 rubles per worker and lower marginal tax rates for higher income 
levels. 
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hours worked (Conway 1997).  The ambiguity arises from opposing income and substitution 
effects.  A decrease in taxes represents both an increase in income – which causes people to buy 
more of both consumption and leisure11 – and an increase in the price of leisure, which causes 
them to work longer hours.  Since the income and substitution effects move hours of work in 
opposite directions, the net effect depends on which one dominates.   
Despite this ambiguity, there are cases where the net effect can be discerned from careful 
inspection of the budget constraint (Eissa and Liebman 1996).  We turn to such an exercise to 
predict, a priori, the possible effect of the tax reform on hours of work.  Prior to the tax reform, 
the Russian PIT structure had graduated rates starting at 12% for the lowest income bracket up to 
50,000 rubles per year and a top rate of 30%.12  Working individuals also had to pay a 1% 
contribution to the pension fund.  The tax reform eliminated the 1% pension tax and replaced the 
graduated rate structure with a linear tax schedule that had standard deduction of 4800 rubles and 
a flat rate of 13%.  Figure 1 illustrates the tax schedule before and after reform.  While we cannot 
predict the net effect on hours, the nature of the change allows us to make some predictions for 
different groups of individuals based on their location on the budget constraint.  Consider Figure 
2; the nonlinear budget constraint given by ABCDE represents the pre-reform status quo.  The 
tax rates on the pre-reform budget constraint are 1 for segment AB, and 13, 21 and 31 for 
segments BC, CD, and DE, respectively.13  The tax reform increased standard deductions from 
3168 to 4800 rubles and replaced the two top rates with the 13% rate for segment BC, yielding 
the post reform budget constraint given by ABF.14 
                                                 
11 This assumes that leisure is a normal good. 
12 In 2000-2001, 50,000 rubles were equivalent to $1786 (at the exchange rate of 28 rubles per U.S. dollar).  
13 We adjust the budget constraint for the 1% payroll tax paid by employees.   
14 The higher standard deduction means that the tax rate fell for some tax payers.  However, the number of 
individuals falling into this category is inconsequential.  As such, the budget constraint does not reflect the increased 
standard deduction.  Additionally, deductions are not available for all taxpayers.  Individuals cannot adjust their 
income for the standard deduction (400 rubles per month) after their accumulated income reaches 20,000 rubles.  
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It is clear from Figure 2 that individuals whose optimal choices are on segment AB or BC 
(excluding the kink point at C) should not be affected by the tax reform.  As such, we would 
expect to see no tax-induced response among individuals in this group.  On the other hand, 
individuals located at the kink point (C) may or may not increase their labor supply depending on 
their preferences.  The standard ambiguous effect from the theory also applies to individuals who 
are on segments CD and DE.  It is not immediately clear what these individuals will choose to do 
given the change in tax policy.  Existing empirical results for this margin are mixed.  While the 
international evidence reveals mostly positive labor supply effects, there is a lot of variation in 
the size of the estimates (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999, Meghir and Phillips 2008).  IKK (2005) 
find either negative or no effect of the Russian reform on hours of work depending on the 
definition of the treatment group.   
The reform may also have had an impact on participation rates given the lower rate and 
higher standard deduction.  However, three facts lower our expectation of any such effects.  
First, as mentioned above, the higher standard deduction affected very few individuals.  Second, 
the bottom rate (13%) did not change for the majority of the pre-reform lower bracket 
individuals.  Therefore, any action along this margin would have to be for individuals entering 
the market at high income levels.  Third, in contrast to Central and Eastern European countries, 
aggregate employment in Russia does not move as much as real wages in response to output 
fluctuations (Boeri and Terrell 2002 and Gorodnichenko, Peter, and Stolyarov 2009), suggesting 
that employment participation may not be very responsive to wages.  
The implicit assumption that individuals can freely change their hours is not innocuous as 
employers generally set a fixed package of hours and wages (Altonji and Paxson 1992).  Instead 
of choosing the number of hours to supply at the primary job of employment, workers may 
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choose to have multiple jobs or moonlight (Matveenko and Saveliev, 2005).  Yet, the effect of 
flat tax reform on multiple job holding is hard to predict.  There is a theoretical possibility that if 
individuals do not pay taxes on their secondary earnings, then lower tax rates on primary wages 
may induce them to shift hours to their primary place of employment, which implies a negative 
effect on secondary employment (Lemieux, Fortin, and Frechette 1994).  However, the flat tax 
reform may also have a positive effect on both the prevalence and reporting of multiple jobs, 
especially in the Russian case.  Prior to the reform, personal income taxes were subject to 
automatic withholding by employers, and workers with a single job were not obliged to fill out 
tax declarations at the end of the year.  Multiple job holders, on the other hand, were required to 
submit tax declarations and faced a higher marginal tax rate if their combined tax liability 
exceeded the amount of taxes withheld by employers.  Thus, under the old tax code, individuals 
would have a lower incentive to have additional formal jobs and a higher incentive to hide (not 
report) other jobs.15  After the flat PIT rate is adopted, multiple job holders whose taxes are 
withheld by employers are no longer required to submit tax declarations, and thus individuals 
may be more inclined to hold multiple jobs as well as report previously concealed secondary jobs 
in the survey.  Only careful empirical analysis can establish which of these two opposite effects 
dominates. 
In sum, from the theoretical standpoint, the effect of the Russian flat tax reform on labor 
supply remains ambiguous. Determining this effect becomes an empirical question and faces 
serious identification problems that will be tackled in the next section.  
                                                 
15 Because tax is withheld at source, failure to declare a secondary job does not imply that the job is informal. 
Individuals may hide the secondary job simply to prevent their tax liability from going above the amount withheld.  
The Russian tax administration at that time did not have capacity to trace individuals with multiple jobs.     
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3. Identification 
3.1. Exploiting the Flat Tax: Difference-in-Difference Approach  
In this section, we discuss the empirical approach taken to estimate the effect of the flat 
tax reform on hours of work.  The fact that the new Russian tax code affected some taxpayers but 
did not affect the others allows us to use the difference-in-difference (DID) method to identify 
the effect of tax changes on labor supply.  Unlike IKK (2005) who estimate the unconditional 
mean DID, we employ the DID regression approach that controls for the hourly gross wage rate, 
non-labor income, other observable labor supply shifters, and constant individual heterogeneity.  
We allow hours supplied to depend on the two separable (in the log form) components of the net-
of-tax wage rate: the gross wage rate and the tax component.  In this case, the effect of tax 
changes on labor supply will be captured through the treatment interaction term.  
Thus, we estimate the following DID model: 
( ) sittitisititsit DTDTZwh εδθθββ +×++++= 2121 , (1) 
where sith is the log of hours supplied by individual i in period t, w is the log of hourly gross wage 
rate, sZ  is a vector of observable supply shifters (e.g., age, marital status, number of children, 
non-labor income, etc.), T is the treatment indicator (= 1 if in the group that experienced a 
decline in marginal tax rates and zero otherwise), D indicates post-reform period, and sitε is the 
error term.16  The coefficient on the interaction term, δ , tells us how hours supplied by the 
treatment group differed from that of the control group post reform, ceteris paribus, and is our 
primary parameter of interest.  The nice feature of the DID technique is that it controls for most 
non-tax factors that affect both groups simultaneously.  The panel nature of our data allows us to 
                                                 
16 We use the log-log specification because it improves the statistical properties of our estimates, mitigates the 
problem of heteroskedasticity, and makes estimates less sensitive to outliers and top coding.  Using the log of hours 
on the left hand side is common in labor supply analysis (e.g., Lee 2001, Pencavel 2002, among others).  However, 
our results hardly change when we use hours instead of the log of hours as dependent variable.   
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decompose the error term into individual effects, year effects, and the iid “white noise”, thus 
making Ti and Dt redundant while retaining the interaction term. 
 The above DID model faces several estimation issues.  In addition to the common 
problem of wage endogeneity in labor supply function, the classification of individuals into 
treatment and control groups poses a serious identification problem.  The most obvious choice of 
the treatment group is all those individuals in the two upper tax brackets whose pre-reform 
implied gross annual income was greater than 50,000 rubles.  Going back to Figure 2, this would 
be everyone on segments CD and DE of the pre-reform budget constraint.  Everyone else would 
fall into the control group.  However, if hours and wages are simultaneously determined, then 
labor supply via income would influence which tax bracket an individual would fall in, hence, 
making the assignment into the treatment group based on pre-reform income endogenous.  
Using pre-reform income will likely to lead to another significant bias in the estimated 
treatment effect as a result of possible misclassification of the treatment group due to widespread 
income underreporting (GMP 2009).  High income earners who are facing higher tax rates but 
choose to underreport their pre-reform income sufficiently will be placed in a lower tax bracket, 
pay lower taxes, and would be wrongly assigned to the control group when they should be 
classified as treated.  If labor supply among these individuals increases post reform due to lower 
rates, the misclassification would cause the response of the control group to be overstated and the 
response of the treatment effect to be understated.17  This could be one of the reasons why IKK 
(2005) obtain the negative effect on hours when they define the treatment group based on pre-
reform reported earnings.18  
                                                 
17 See GMP (2009) NBER working paper version for a detailed derivation of the evasion bias created if pre-reform 
income is used to identify treatment and control groups and how using post reform income eliminates this bias. 
18 Besides pre-reform individual reported earnings, IKK (2005) also use pre-reform implied true gross household 
labor income per working adult to assign individuals to treatment and control groups.  While this approach mitigates 
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To avoid these potential problems, we follow GMP’s definition of treatment and control 
groups and classify individuals as treated if their post-reform implied gross annual income is 
greater than 50,000 rubles.  Using post-reform income accounts for the possible misclassification 
of individuals due to changes in compliance and thus minimizes the resulting evasion bias.  It 
also addresses the issues of endogenous self-selection into the treatment group.  We take 
advantage of the flat tax rate by exploiting the fact that all taxpayers after reform face the same 
marginal tax rate regardless of income and irrespective of hours of work.  Therefore, the 
assignment into the treatment and control groups based on post-reform income is not affected by 
behavioral responses to differential tax rates.  
Although the DID method is suitable for estimating the impact of marginal tax rates on 
hours worked, it still suffers from potential biases.  For example, Russia was on the rebound after 
going through the 1998 financial crisis.  If this recovery period affected the treatment group 
differently than it did the control group, then the DID estimates will be biased unless we fully 
account for these differences. Additionally, the DID estimates will be biased by any 
heterogeneity we fail to capture in our model due to unobservables that vary differentially across 
treatment and control groups over time.   
To address these possibilities, we exploit the fact the tax rates changed discontinuously at 
the threshold of 50,000 rubles under the new tax schedule.  Given such a distinct discontinuity in 
a continuous income variable, the treatment effect can be estimated using individuals that are 
very similar to each other in every way except for the marginal tax rate they face.  In other 
                                                                                                                                                             
the tax evasion bias, it is exposed to other biases.  For example, the Russian tax system does not allow for family-
based tax filing and determines the tax liability based on individual income.  Given that many Russian households 
are large and have more than one earner (56% of working households), individual gross income cannot be correctly 
inferred from average household net income per working adult.  Since the approach assigns everyone in a given 
household to the same group, households with high and low earners will have at least one misclassified person.  The 
“true labor income” is also likely to be mismeasured as it is based on non-durable expenditures minus pensions and 
unemployment benefits.  As such, it does not account for savings, expenditures on durables, private transfers, capital 
income and some sources of non-taxable non-labor income such as stipends, social welfare, and child support.   
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words, we can identify the labor supply effects of the reform by comparing individuals that are 
just above the income threshold of 50,000 rubles to those individuals that are just below the 
threshold.  These individuals should respond similarly to the economic recovery as well as have 
similar unobservables not captured by individual fixed effects.  This makes it possible to obtain 
cleaner estimates of the treatment effect than DID (GMP 2009).  
3.2. Endogeneity of Wages 
The methods discussed above allow us to deal with the endogeneity of the marginal tax 
rates but does not address wage endogeneity.  Wages remain problematic for identification due 
to the simultaneous determination of equilibrium wages and hours on the labor market.  Other 
potential sources of wage endogeneity include a likely division bias, non-random income 
underreporting, and measurement error.  We address these issues using two different but related 
approaches.  First we derive reduced form wage and labor supply equations from a simultaneous 
system including labor supply and demand functions.  The second method uses demand shifters 
as instrumental variables for wages in the labor supply regression.  In this section, we discuss 
each approach starting with the reduced form approach.  We begin with the following system of 
structural equations that describe the labor market equilibrium: 
( ) sittisititsit DTZwh εδββ +×++= 21  (2) 
d
it
d
itit
d
it Zwh εαα ++= 21  (3) 
ds hh = , (4) 
where dh is the log of hours of work demanded by employers, dZ  is a vector of observable labor 
demand shifters (aggregate and local productivity shocks, technological change, the employer’s 
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share in the labor market, etc.)19, dε  is the error term in the demand equation, and the other 
variables are as defined above.  We assume that demand and supply shifters are exogenous and 
uncorrelated with respective error terms.  Imposing the equilibrium condition yields the 
following reduced form wage equation: 
( ) ittiditsitit uDTZZw +×−−−+−−= 1111
2
11
2
αβ
δ
αβ
α
αβ
β ,  (5) 
which we rewrite as:  
( ) ittiditsitit uDTZZw +×++= 321 γγγ , (6) 
where 
11 αβ
εε
−
−=
s
it
d
it
itu .  Substituting (5) into (2) gives us the reduced form labor supply equation: 
( ) ittiditsitsit DTZZh υαβ
δα
αβ
αβ
αβ
βα +×−−−+−−= 11
1
11
21
11
21 , (7) 
which we rewrite as:  
( ) ittiditsitsit DTZZh υπππ +×++= 321 , (8) 
where 
11
11
αβ
εαεβυ −
−=
s
it
d
it
it , and πi are the reduced form estimates.   
Equations (7) and (8) imply that ߜ ൌ ߨଷ ቀ1 െ
ఉభ
ఈభ
ቁ.  If higher wages increase labor supply 
and reduce labor demand, then we know that our estimate of ቀ1 െ ఉభ
ఈభ
ቁ will be greater than one.  
This then implies that the estimated reduced form treatment effect, ߨଷ, will give us a lower 
bound of the true treatment effect, ߜ.  Therefore, with appropriate demand and supply shifters we 
can obtain a lower bound estimate of the treatment effect by estimating equation (8) only.  In this 
case, we do not need to worry about the endogeneity of wages. 
                                                 
19 Demand and supply shifters may partially intersect and be part of both equations.  The equation (2) is identified as 
long as there is at least one exogenous demand shifter that has a nonzero population coefficient in equation (3) and 
does not affect labor supply. 
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In principle, it is possible to recover the structural treatment effect by estimating (6) and 
(8) together and solving the system of equations.  However, it is not necessary as long as there 
are suitable demand shifters that could be used as instruments for wages in equation (2).20  In this 
case, equation (2) will be fully identified and give us a consistent and direct estimate of ߜ.  
Another advantage of the IV approach is that, unlike the reduced form method, we do not have to 
worry about the possible independent effect of the reform on labor demand.  The IV approach 
also allows us to estimate the effect of wages on hours worked while the reduced form approach 
does not.   
4. Data 
In this section, we introduce the RLMS data that will be used in estimating the outlined 
empirical model.  The RLMS is a comprehensive household survey conducted annually since 
1994, except for 1997 and 1999.  The panel nature of the data and the fact that we have data 
before and after the reform are particularly useful in exploiting the “natural experiment” aspect 
of the reform while accounting for individual heterogeneity.  We are also able to capture medium 
to long-term effects as individuals respond to tax changes.  Approximately 10,000 individuals 
are interviewed each year.  We restrict our sample to individuals who were born between 1945 
and 1980 (20 to 55 years old in year 2000).  This adjustment leaves us with approximately 6,000 
observations per year (54% females).  These individuals are largely representative of the country 
population as they come from 38 randomly selected primary sample units (psu or municipalities 
thereafter) and 32 of 89 constituencies of the Russian Federation (or regions thereafter).   
                                                 
20 An important requirement of the IV approach is that there should be at least one demand shifter that has a non-
zero effect on labor demand but excluded from the labor supply equation.  We discuss various instruments in 
Section 5. 
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The RLMS has detailed information on multiple measures of hours worked and 
employment participation.  Information on hours of work is available for primary and secondary 
jobs separately and for supplementary individual economic activities.  Figure 3 shows that hours 
at primary job take up a significant share of all work hours (98%) and the proportion of workers 
with more than one job has been relatively small and stable for females (7-9%) but declined 
rapidly for males from 15% to 7% over the ten-year period.  Due to the irregular nature of most 
supplementary individual economic activities, we include those activities in robustness 
specifications only and focus our labor supply analysis on primary and secondary jobs. 
We use actual number of hours worked last month (actual hours, ha) as well as usual 
hours of work in a typical week multiplied by 4 weeks (usual hours, hu).  Actual hours tend to be 
lower and have higher variability than usual hours due to vacations, sick leaves and other reasons 
(Figures 4).  Females typically work 5-6 hours less per week than males but they have larger 
variability of working hours.  Overall, the dispersion of hours falls during 1994-1996 and stays 
stable afterwards. 
Figure 4 also reveals that the trends in hours of work follow the business cycle with a 
decline until the 1998 financial crisis and a modest increase during the recovery.  Compared to 
the 1990s, the trends in hours of work just before and after the tax reform (2000-2004) were 
relatively steady and did not experience large fluctuations.  Furthermore, if we exclude data from 
the 1990s, the simple regression of the log of hours worked (actual or usual) on a post-reform 
dummy controlling for constant individual heterogeneity does not show statistically significant 
movements in hours of work after 2001 for both males and females.  This result does not imply 
that the reform had no positive effect on the number of hours worked as the aggregate numbers 
might be hiding significant variation across groups.  It could also be the case that other 
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macroeconomic factors caused aggregate hours to move in a way that cancels the positive tax 
rate effect.  For example, increased share of government transfers and other non-labor sources of 
income in 2001-2004 may have had a negative income effect on labor supply.  It is also possible 
that increased employment participation among groups with typically lower hours (females, 
young cohorts, and college graduates) may have decreased the average aggregate hours.  
Because of these and other confounding factors, it is important that a proper identification 
strategy be used to determine the effect of the reform on labor supply.   
Besides hours of work, we also examine the employment participation response to tax 
changes.  Panel A of Figure 5 depicts a very high employment-to-population ratio for both males 
and females, which is commonly observed in transition economies.  We see that the 
employment-to-population ratio has followed a pronounced U-shaped path in the 1990s, but it 
stabilized around year 2000 and stayed at 84-86 percent for males and 78-80 percent for females 
in subsequent years.21  Again, as with hours, we do not observe a noticeable shift in employment 
participation following the 2001 tax reform. 
Individual labor earnings are another essential variable in our empirical model.  
Respondents are asked to report two measures of labor earnings: monetary after-tax earnings 
received last month (actual earnings) and average monthly after-tax earnings in the last 12 
months (contractual earnings).  These measures of labor earnings are used with the 
corresponding monthly hours to calculate actual and contractual hourly net wages, wa and wc, 
depicted in panel B of Figure 5.  We observe that actual earnings received last month are much 
more variable than contractual earnings, which is partly due to widespread wage arrears and 
irregular wage payments during 1994-1998.  Because gross declared earnings are not available in 
                                                 
21 See Gorodnichenko, Peter, and Stolyarov (2009) for a more detailed discussion of the trends in employment and 
hours.   
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RLMS, we compute them based on after-tax reported earnings and the PIT rate schedule with 
deductions.  Appendix A1 provides details of computations. 
In addition to providing the overall macroeconomic picture, the above trends in hours, 
employment, and wages are also helpful in determining the appropriate time span for our 
analysis.  For reasons of high volatility in both hours and wages and the lack of measures on 
usual hours and contractual wages, we exclude the 1994-1996 period from our analysis.  In 
baseline specifications, we also leave out year 1998 to avoid the potential influence of the 
financial crisis on the treatment effect estimates, and year 2005 to make our labor supply 
response estimates comparable with the consumption-based estimates of total earned income 
response to tax changes in GMP (2009).  Thus, our baseline specification is estimated for the 
2000-2004 sample period.  However, we do include 1998 and 2005 in supplementary 
specifications to test for robustness of our results. 
A standard labor supply model requires several other variables, including non-labor 
family income, age, years of schooling, marital status, and number of children, among others.  
We provide more details on each variable in Appendix Table A1 and their summary statistics by 
gender and treatment status in Table 1.  The treatment status is determined based on post-reform 
actual labor earnings from primary and secondary jobs.22  From Table 1 we observe that treated 
males are relatively younger, more educated, and more likely to be married and have children 
than the control group.  Treated males also have greater non-labor income, earn higher wages, 
likely to have more than one job, and work longer hours compared to males in the control group.  
With the exception of age, children, and marital status, similar observations are made for treated 
females relative to females in the control group.  Unlike their male counterparts, treated females 
                                                 
22 The new PIT schedule mainly affected labor income.  Most forms of capital income are taxed at different rates 
while private and public transfers remain non-taxable.  The share of taxable non-labor income is less than 1% in our 
data.  In Section 5, we show the sensitivity of our estimates to alternative definitions of the treatment group.  
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are less likely to be married and have children and are the same age as females in the control 
group.  In addition to mean hours, we also plot the distribution of actual hours by treatment 
status in Figure 6.  While there is no visual evidence that the distribution of hours changed after 
reform for either group of females, we do observe a slight shift in the distribution of male hours 
to the left for the control group and to the right for the treatment group.  From the plotted 
distributions, it is not clear whether labor supply response varies along the percentiles of hour 
distribution.  To reach more definite answer, we perform the quantile regression analysis that 
will be discussed in section 5.6. 
5. Results 
5.1. DID Baseline Model 
We first present the estimates of the baseline labor supply model for males and females 
separately.  We estimate four equations: equation (1) with year effects by OLS; equation (2) with 
individual and year fixed effects by OLS; equation (2) with individual and year fixed effects by 
IV; and reduced-form specification as in equation (8) with individual and year fixed effects by 
OLS.  The baseline model includes the log of actual hours worked in the last 30 days on the left-
hand side and controls for the log of hourly gross wage rate wc, age, years of schooling, marital 
status, number of children, the log of non-labor family income, and a dummy variable indicating 
if labor is the only source of family income.23  All constant local and family characteristics are 
controlled by default when individual fixed effects are included.  Treatment and control groups 
are defined using positive actual labor earnings at primary and secondary jobs.  All estimates 
report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors to correct for arbitrary serial correlation. 
                                                 
23 The log of non-labor income is calculated as log (1+non-labor income).  Therefore, individuals whose sole source 
of income is from labor would have a value of zero.  To control for the kink at zero value, we include a dummy 
variable indicating if labor is the only source of family income.   
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Both IV and reduced-form approaches require labor demand shifters as exclusion 
restrictions. Unlike most household surveys, the RLMS asks respondents about the 
characteristics of their employers.  One of those characteristics, firm employment size, might be 
argued to influence the demand for labor.  We can appeal to both the standard monopsony model 
and the size-wage premium literature (e.g., Brown and Medoff 1989) to justify the choice of firm 
size as a labor demand shifter.  Another employer characteristic asked in the RLMS is whether 
the firm is owned by foreign entities.  We can use this variable to calculate the local (psu) share 
of foreign firms in total employment and refer to the large body of FDI literature that examines 
the effect of foreign firm concentration on domestic productivity (and thus on the demand for 
product and labor) via spillovers and crowding out (e.g., Aitken and Harrison 1999, Haddad 
1993, and Javorcik 2004).24  Finally, we turn to external data sources for some regional labor 
demand shifters that reflect changes in aggregate employment and productivity.  Consequently, 
our vector of labor demand shifters include 9 categories of firm size, the local employment share 
of foreign firms, the annual difference in the log of regional employment, and the annual 
difference in the log of regional value added per capita.  Summary statistics for the demand 
shifters are presented in Table A2.  We make sure that these instruments are jointly statistically 
significant in the first stage and pass the over-identification test.25   
We report the DID estimates of the baseline model for males and females in Tables 2 and 
3, respectively.26  As indicated earlier, our primary interest is in the estimated treatment effect.  
The OLS result for males yields a treatment effect of 0.073 log points, which indicate that males’ 
                                                 
24 Using Russian firm-level data, Sabirianova, Svejnar, and Terrell (2005) find that the share of foreign firms in 
employment has a negative effect on the productivity of domestic firms and positive effect on other foreign firms.   
25 The firm size variable was subsequently dropped from female specifications because it failed the IV validity test.  
Specifically, no statistically significant relationship is found between the firm size and female wages.  
26 Hours of work is found to be concave in age for both males and females.  With the exception of the reduced form 
specification, these results are statistically significant.  We find no statistically significant effect of marital status or 
years of schooling on hours worked except in the OLS specification where married males (females) work more 
(fewer) hours.  The qualitative aspects of these results remain the same in all of our specifications. 
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actual hours worked increased by approximately 7.3% as a result of the lower tax rates 
implemented in the tax reform.  The estimate falls by 2 percentage points to 5.2% when we 
control for time-invariant individual heterogeneity, but remains statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  When we use demand shifters as instruments for wages in the third column, the treatment 
effect estimate is of the same magnitude (5.3%) and indicates that the reform had a statistically 
significant positive effect on male labor hours.  We check that the instruments are jointly 
statistically significant in the first stage at the 1% level and that the over-identification test does 
not reject the null that the instruments are exogenous (Hansen J-Statistic p-value is 0.329). We 
also use the demand shifters to estimate the treatment effect in the reduced form labor supply 
model.  The estimated effect of 5.1% is slightly smaller than that obtained using IV and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  The fact that the reduced form estimate is lower than the 
IV one is consistent with our earlier arguments that the reduced form estimates are a lower bound 
to the true impact of the reform.  The results in Table 3 indicate that the reform had no effect on 
female hours of work; all estimates are statistically and economically insignificant.   
5.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
The following section shows how the above estimates of the treatment effect are sensitive 
to alternative measures of hours of work (actual vs. usual hours), different coverage of jobs 
(hours at primary job, primary and secondary job, and all jobs), definitions of the treatment and 
control groups (actual vs. contractual labor earnings), and different samples (restricted sample 
and sample with additional years 1998 and 2005).  We report the treatment effect estimates from 
the two specifications: equation (2) with individual and year fixed effects by IV (Table 4) and 
equation (8) with individual and year fixed effects by OLS (Table A3).  Each cell in Tables 4 and 
A3 presents the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between the treatment group (upper 
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brackets) and a post-reform dummy using different measures of hours, earnings, and samples.27  
All specifications include the same set of variables as in Tables 2 and 3.     
The results in Table 4 mostly confirm the results discussed in Tables 2 and 3.  From panel 
A, we find that the treatment effect for males ranges from 4.5% (primary job only) to 6.7% (all 
jobs) when we use actual hours as our dependent variable.  This implies that actual hours 
increased in all jobs, including secondary employment and individual economic activities, as a 
result of the reform.  The same pattern is observed for usual hours, although the estimates are 
smaller: 3.1% for primary job and 4.8% for all jobs.  This result is not surprising since usual 
hours of work are subject to less erratic variation over time.   
Panel B of Table 4 reports additional robustness checks based on hours worked at 
primary and secondary job.  First, we observe that including 1998 or 2005 in the estimation 
sample does not have any significant effect on the estimates.  We also restrict the sample to 
individuals whose implied gross annual earnings are between 4,800 and 100,000 rubles.  We use 
the restricted sample to remove the influence of standard deduction and eliminate the differential 
effect of the regressive unified social tax paid by employers.  For each worker in the restricted 
sample, employers should pay the same 35.6% rate of the unified social tax after 2000.  Another 
benefit of the restricted sample is that the treatment group would have faced the same 21% rate if 
the pre-reform tax scale had remained after 2000 (the next 31% bracket begins with 150,000 
rubles).  In another robustness check, we add interactions between district dummies (at the psu 
level) and year dummies to control for time-varying local shocks.  Finally, we use contractual 
labor earnings instead of actual earnings in defining the treatment group.  In each case the 
estimated treatment effect for actual hours remains in the range of 4.6–6.1% and is statistically 
                                                 
27 We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors to correct for arbitrary serial correlation.  The IV estimations in 
Table 4 are performed using the Stata 10 module xtivreg2 (Schaffer 2007).  The conventional treatment of outliers is 
also applied. 
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significant.  The estimates for usual hours of work remain marginally smaller than those for 
actual hours but maintain their statistical significance and quantitative magnitude (4–5.6%).  
Table 4 also reports estimates of the treatment effect for females.  We find no effect on actual or 
usual hours of work regardless of specification.     
Additional supporting evidence of the pattern of change we have observed so far is 
presented in Table A3, where the reduced form specification is used.  There we observe that the 
reform had a positive and statistically significant effect on both actual and usual hours of work 
for males and no effect on females.  The estimates for males are modestly smaller in size than 
those reported in Table 4 (3–5%) but remain statistically significant at the 5% level.  On the 
other hand, the estimates for females are statistically insignificant regardless of specification.   
These results are different from previous estimates by IKK (2005).  While they find no 
evidence that the reform affected number of hours worked, we find that the reform affected male 
hours positively and had little or no effect on female hours.28   
Because the reform affected two upper brackets of the pre-reform tax schedule, we also 
examine the effect of tax reform on individuals in each bracket (21% and 31%).  The purpose of 
this exercise is to see if the strength of labor supply response varies with income.  The results 
from this specification (both IV and reduced form) are reported in Table A4.  They confirm the 
previous finding of a significant positive effect on males and no effect on females.  More 
interesting though, is the fact that individuals in both brackets responded similarly to tax 
changes.  Male earners in the top bracket increased their hours more than those in the middle 
                                                 
28 We obtain qualitatively similar results to that reported in IKK (2005) when we replicate their approach.  In 
particular, we estimate our OLS specification in Tables 2 and 3 with no distinction between males and females, no 
explanatory variables (except for the post reform dummy, the treatment dummy, and their interaction), and only two 
years (2000 and 2001).  When we do this, the treatment effect becomes statistically insignificant as in their paper.  
When we follow the same approach above but stratify by gender, we find a statistically significant positive effect for 
males and no effect for females.  We also get a statistically significant positive effect if we include additional years 
and/or explanatory variables.  It is clear that ignoring these dimensions of the problem contributed to the finding 
reported by IKK (2005).  These results are not reported but can be obtained upon request from the authors.  
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bracket, but the difference between the two brackets is not statistically significant in 3 of 4 
specifications.       
To further assess the validity of our results, we test if there is labor supply response 
within the control group.  We divide the control group into two groups of high and low earners at 
three different points: standard deduction threshold (4,800 rubles), the highest annual income at 
which standard deduction can be applied (20,000 rubles), and the random point of 40,000 rubles.  
In all three cases, we do not find statistically significant differences in labor supply response 
between high and low earners of the control group after the reform.  To save space, the results 
are not reported but available upon request. 
5.3. Weighted Difference-in-Difference 
Our next set of estimates employs the above DID method but weights each individual 
observation by the distance of reported earnings from the threshold of 50,000 rubles.  GMP 
(2009) use this weighted difference-in-difference (WDID) approach in estimating the tax evasion 
response to tax changes.  We apply the same method to identify the labor supply response at the 
point of discontinuity around the income threshold.  In this case, the treatment effect is less likely 
to be confounded with other factors as individuals are drawn from the same portion of income 
distribution and likely to have similar unobservables.  In a way, the WDID estimation is 
analogous to the regression discontinuity (RD) design.    
Following GMP, we write the estimated model as:  
( )( )21 21n s s sip it it it i t iti h w Z T Dψ β β δ ε= − − − × −∑ , (9) 
 where ߰௜௣ is the weight assigned to individual i in post reform period p.  The weights are a 
decreasing function of the distance between the post-reform earnings and pre-reform threshold.  
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density, b≈0.17 is the optimal Gaussian “plug-in” bandwidth, YR is post-reform reported earnings 
and Y# is the pre-reform threshold.  The use of post-reform earnings in defining the treatment and 
control groups is especially critical for the RD-type approaches requiring that the income 
variable has no discontinuous jumps at the threshold.  This requirement is violated if we use pre-
reform income due to the tax evasion response, which leads to the clustering of reported earnings 
just below the threshold prior to the reform.  Such clustering undermines the fundamental 
assumption on which the RD approach is based, thus leading to biased estimates.   
Table 5 reports the WDID estimates with individual fixed effects.  Again, we use demand 
shifters as instrumental variables for endogenous wages.  The estimated treatment effects are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained using the unweighted DID technique (Table 4).  
Specifically, the range of the WDID estimates for males overlap with that of DID: 4–6% for 
actual hours and 3–5% for usual hours.29  The results for females in columns 4 and 5 confirm our 
conclusion up to this point that the reform did not have a statistically significant effect on hours 
supplied by females.   
5.4. Elasticity of Labor Supply  
In this section we discuss the size of labor supply elasticities with respect to marginal tax 
rates implied by the estimated treatment effects for hours of work.  This exercise is especially 
important for researchers and policy makers interested in understanding the implications of 
future policy changes.  Additionally, the estimates can be used in computable general 
                                                 
29 The WDID estimate of the treatment effect is fairly insensitive to any bandwidth larger than 0.1.  If the bandwidth 
falls below 0.1 (which implies a steep decrease in the weighting function), the treatment effect maintains its 
magnitude but becomes statistically insignificant due to the insufficient number of observations around the income 
threshold.   
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equilibrium models and other macroeconomic models geared towards quantifying the impact of 
economic policies on the economy.   
The elasticity of working hours with respect to tax rates is calculated as 
0.21
( 0.08)
2.63hh h
τ τ
τ τ τδ δ δ∂ ∂ ∂ −∈ = = = = − , where δ  is the estimated treatment effect, τ  is the 
marginal tax rate, and 0.13 0.21 0.08τ∂ = − = −  is the change in tax rate.  For example, the labor 
supply elasticity derived from the baseline IV estimate for males (Table 2) is
2.63 0.053 0.14− × ≈ − .  This implies that a 1% reduction in the marginal tax rate increases male 
hours of work by 0.14%, ceteris paribus.   The elasticity estimates based on alternative samples, 
specifications, and methods (Tables 4 and 5) fall in a fairly small band of approximately -0.08 to 
-0.18.  The labor supply elasticity for females is not statistically significant from zero.30   
Given that the share of females in the treatment group is about 40%, the population-
averaged elasticity of the labor supply response to tax changes for the baseline specification 
becomes (–0.14 × 0.6 + 0 × 0.4) ≈ –0.084.  Although our elasticity estimates point to a very weak 
response of hours to changes in tax rate, they are not implausible (Meghir and Phillips 2008).  
For example, Immervoll et al (2007) used elasticity estimates in the range 0.1–0.2 for their 
simulations of welfare reforms on income distribution and efficiency in Europe.  Kumar (2008) 
cites several studies that find little or no changes in labor supply following the 1986 U.S. tax 
reform.  Our estimates are consistent with the small elasticities of total earned income with 
respect to tax rate (about –0.05) obtained by GMP (2009) based on the consumption response to 
the Russian flat tax reform.   
                                                 
30 These labor supply elasticities are closer to the compensated Frisch-type elasticities.  The Frisch elasticity requires 
the marginal utility of wealth to be constant.  In our case, individual fixed effects account for all time-invariant 
factors of labor supply, including the marginal utility of wealth that is unlikely to change over the short time span of 
our data.    
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The small magnitude of labor supply response implies that it is unlikely that the observed 
spike in the after-reform PIT revenue could be explained by increased hours of work due to the 
flat tax rate.  Suppose that PIT revenue could be roughly approximated as R = W × h × t, where 
W is the observed gross hourly wage rate.  Given that the share of the treated males in total 
working population is about a third, a post-reform increase in aggregate hours of work should be 
5.3% × 0.33 ≈ 1.7% over the 4-year period.  Consequently, increased hours of work in response 
to tax changes cannot account for more than a 1.7% increase in overall PIT revenue. 
5.5. Extensive Margins 
The above estimates of labor supply response are conditional on being employed and thus 
do not take into account the possible impact of the reform on employment participation.  It is 
now widely accepted that responses along extensive margins (participation) are just as important 
as intensive margin responses (hours) (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999 and Saez 2002).  However, 
the estimation of responses along extensive margins is complicated by the fact that we do not 
observe labor earnings for non-participants and hence cannot assign these individuals to 
treatment or control groups.  One way of dealing with this problem is to assign non-participants 
to treatment and control groups based on their post-reform predicted earnings.31  Then for those 
individuals that did not have a job in 2000, we can estimate the effect of tax changes on the 
probability of finding a job after reform. 
Suppose the probability of finding a job pit conditional on observables Xit is defined as 
( )itiitit XEEPp |,0|1 2000, === , where Eit is the indicator of employment participation for 
                                                 
31 Labor earnings for working-age non-participants are predicted using gender, age, age squared, years of schooling, 
marital status, number of children, non-labor household income, regional labor demand shifters, and 38 dummies for 
municipalities. 
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individual i in year t.  Then, we can estimate the following DID linear probability model with 
fixed effects: 
ittiti
d
it
s
itit DTZZE εθμλλλ +++×++= )(321 , (10) 
where Eit is a dummy indicating whether a respondent worked at least one hour at primary job in 
the last 30 days, sZ and dZ are vectors of observable labor supply and demand shifters, 
respectively, T is the treatment indicator, D indicates post-reform period, µi and θt are individual 
and time fixed effects, and itε is the iid error term.  The estimated model has the same set of 
explanatory variables as in Table A3.     
Table 6 reports the estimates for each of these participation measures using either actual 
labor earnings (columns 1 and 3) or contractual earnings (columns 2 and 4) in defining the 
treatment group.  As before, we estimate the models for males and females separately.  The 
results show that the reform had a statistically significant effect on the probability of job finding.  
In fact, the probability of making the transition to work increases by approximately 0.08–0.14 for 
both treated males and females regardless of which labor earnings we use to determine treatment.  
We therefore find that treated individuals are more likely to transition into employment 
following the reform relative to individuals in the control group.   
In a similar vein, we estimate the effect of reform on the probability of making the 
transition from one job to multiple jobs.  Our discussion in Section 2 revealed that changes in the 
Russian tax code may have created incentives to have (or report) additional formal jobs; yet the 
total effect of tax changes on multiple job holding from the theoretical point of view is 
ambiguous.  The results in Table 6 indicate that the probability of having additional jobs 
increased by 0.018–0.023 for females as a result of the reform.  There was no significant effect 
for males.     
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5.6. More on Female Labor Supply 
The finding that female hours did not respond to the reform is an unusual result when one 
considers the vast international literature on labor supply (Meghir and Phillips 2008). Our 
attempts to search for an explanation of this result by interacting the treatment terms with various 
individual and household characteristics turned out to be mostly unsuccessful.  We find no 
evidence that the female treatment effect varies by marital status, number and age of children, 
household composition, respondent’s age, schooling, location, firm size, job sector, and other 
variables (the results are not reported to preserve space).  These results, for example, rule out the 
explanation that females who fulfill additional household functions (e.g., having pre-school 
children) may find it more difficult to adjust working hours.    
At the same time, we know from the previous section that females did respond in terms 
of employment participation.  They also have a higher probability of switching to multiple jobs 
after the reform.  The fact that females responded along extensive, but not intensive, margins can 
be due to the lack of hour flexibility at the primary place of employment.  If this is the case, then 
we should probably expect a larger response among females working part-time as their hours 
tend to be more flexible.  To test this hypothesis, we estimate equation (1) at different points of 
the hour distribution by using quantile regressions and report the estimated treatment effect at 
each percentile in Figure 7.  The findings confirm our expectations.  We observe that the female 
labor supply response is relatively large and positive in the bottom and very top parts of the 
distribution where hours tend to be more flexible.  The response among females in the middle of 
the distribution is flat at around zero.  This is contrary to the pattern observed for males.  The 
male labor supply response is highly volatile in the lower tail (due to small number of males in 
part-time employment) but increases steadily along the distribution from the 30th percentile 
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upward.  The treatment effect among males is large and positive in the second half of the 
distribution.  As a robustness check, we also interacted all treatment and time terms in equation 
(1) with the part-time status (<120 hours worked last month) and find that part-time females tend 
to have a stronger and positive response to tax changes than females working full time.  Thus, 
the zero effect found for females in the mean regressions is likely to be due to the rigidity of 
hours in the middle of distribution.  
6. Conclusions 
The Russian tax reform represents one of the major tax reforms of the 21st century.  
Despite its significant popularity, very little in the way of empirical analysis has been done to 
test its impact on real responses.  We attempt to bridge this gap in the literature by estimating the 
impact of the reform on several margins of labor supply including hours of work.  The estimated 
hours responses are used to calculate implied elasticities that can be used in general equilibrium 
models to predict the possible impact of future policy changes.   
Using micro level data on individuals from the RLMS, we implement DID and RD-type 
methodologies to identify the treatment effect of the reform on actual and usual hours of work.  
The nature of the reform allows us to address the endogeneity of marginal tax rates while the 
endogeneity of wages is addressed using labor demand shifters as instrumental variables.  We 
estimate labor supply functions separately for males and females to account for the fact the 
females respond differently than males to labor market incentives.   
Regardless of the estimation technique used, we find that the reform had a positive 
impact on male hours of work with implied elasticities - with respect to tax rates - ranging from 
0.08−  to 0.18− .  Although relatively small, these estimates are in line with existing male labor 
supply elasticities.  The more surprising result is that the reform had no statistically significant 
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effect on female average hours of work.  Further analysis reveals that while this result is true on 
average, there is significant variability in the treatment effect at different percentiles of the 
corresponding hour distribution.  In particular, we find a positive labor supply response among 
part-time female workers and also at the very top of the female hour distribution where hours 
tend to me more flexible.  However, female hours are fairly rigid in the middle of the respective 
hour distribution. 
We also find evidence that individuals responded to the flat tax rate along the extensive 
margins of labor supply.  The probability of finding a job increased for both males and females, 
and more females transitioned from one job to multiple jobs after the reform.  Our results 
indicate that the aggregate estimates of labor supply effects are likely to conceal considerable 
variation in the response across individuals and various margins.  
One of the major questions surrounding the Russian flat tax reform is whether or not the 
increase in PIT revenues following the reform can be credibly attributed to the change in 
marginal tax rates.  Although our empirical results show that the number of hours worked by 
males increased as a result of the lower PIT rates, there is no evidence that the increased PIT 
revenues can be explained by this response.  In fact, the revenue gains from the increase in hours 
of work are not sufficient to make up for the lost revenue resulting from lower PIT rates.   
Our results along with a well established labor supply literature make it clear that 
aggregate hours of work may very well be the smallest source of response to tax changes.  In the 
case of Russia, for example, the response in compliance proved more important than aggregate 
hours for the revenue response.  This implies that countries with high levels of non-compliance 
are more likely to benefit from flattening their tax schedules than those where compliance is 
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relatively high.  It is therefore important that policy makers consider carefully the institutional 
context of their respective countries before adopting similar tax policies.   
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Figure 1: Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate Before and After Reform 
 
 
Notes:  Taxable income is annual and in rubles.  The 2000 marginal PIT rates include 1 percent individual 
contribution to the pension fund.  Standard deductions were 3,168 rubles in 2000, but they increased to 4,800 rubles 
in 2001.    
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Figure 2: Budget Constraint Implied by the Tax Schedule Before and After Reform 
 
 
Notes: The slope of each segment is given by -w(1-ti), where w is the gross wage rate and ti is the marginal tax rate 
defined as  t0=0.01, t1=0.13, t2=0.21, t3=0.31. 
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Figure 3: Trends in Labor Supply 
 
 
 
Notes:  Panel A shows trends in actual hours worked last month at primary job (pj), primary and secondary jobs 
(ps), and all jobs.  Sample is restricted to individuals who were between 20-55 years old in the year 2000. 
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Figure 4: Actual and Usual Hours of Work by Gender 
 
 
 
Notes: ha = actual hours worked last month; hu = usual hours of work per month.  Hours in both panels are totals 
for primary and secondary jobs.  Sample is restricted to individuals who were between 20-55 years old in the year 
2000.  
14
0
16
0
18
0
20
0
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
ha:male ha:fem hu:male hu:fem
A.Monthly hours of work
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
ha:male ha:fem hu:male hu:fem
B.Var-log hours
40 
 
Figure 5: Trends in Employment and Wages 
 
 
 
Notes: wa = hourly net wage rate based on earnings received last month; wc = contractual hourly net wage rate.  All 
wages are after-tax and deflated with national monthly CPI.  Wages in panel B are totals for primary and secondary 
jobs.  Sample is restricted to individuals who were between 20-55 years old in the year 2000. 
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Figure 6: Distribution of Hours Before and After Reform 
 
 
 
Notes: The log of hours is plotted on horizontal axes and truncated at 4.  Sample is restricted to individuals who 
were between 20-55 years old in the year 2000. 
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Figure 7: Quantile Estimates of the Treatment Effect 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Males Females 
 Control 
Group 
Treated 
Group All 
Control 
Group 
Treated 
Group All 
Age 39.487 37.502 38.058 39.273 39.793 39.524 
 (10.314) (9.635) (9.870) (9.806) (9.579) (9.700) 
Years of schooling 11.095 12.133 11.842 12.072 13.040 12.540 
 (2.018) (2.177) (2.184) (1.973) (2.011) (2.049) 
Married 0.833 0.862 0.854 0.724 0.679 0.702 
 (0.373) (0.345) (0.353) (0.447) (0.467) (0.457) 
1 or 2 children in HH 0.419 0.484 0.466 0.460 0.401 0.431 
 (0.494) (0.500) (0.499) (0.498) (0.490) (0.495) 
3 or more children in HH 0.025 0.010 0.014 0.012 0.006 0.009 
 (0.156) (0.098) (0.117) (0.110) (0.076) (0.095) 
Child <7 years old in  0.285 0.312 0.304 0.252 0.204 0.229 
HH (0.451) (0.463) (0.460) (0.434) (0.403) (0.420) 
Non-labor family income  2277 3598 3229 3166 4689 3903 
last month (rubles) (2368) (4923) (4401) (3642) (5971) (4967) 
Labor only source of  0.066 0.100 0.091 0.053 0.089 0.070 
Income (dummy) (0.248) (0.300) (0.287) (0.224) (0.285) (0.256) 
Contractual  gross wage  9.057 26.216 21.413 8.722 22.765 15.514 
rate (rubles) (6.781) (26.300) (23.880) (6.249) (19.957) (16.187) 
Actual hours last month 187.163 190.631 189.660 161.362 170.706 165.881 
 (54.043) (55.494) (55.111) (49.298) (48.560) (49.162) 
Usual hours per month 189.150 194.306 192.863 167.998 175.894 171.817 
 (54.043) (55.710) (55.294) (53.705) (51.599) (52.842) 
N 2240 5762 8002 4901 4591 9492 
 
Notes: Means reported are for the 2000-2004 estimation sample with standard deviations are in parenthesis.  All 
monetary figures are in year 2000 prices.  Contractual gross wage rate and both measures of hours are for combined 
primary and secondary jobs.   See Table A1 for a detailed description of each variable.  
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Table 2: Labor Supply Function: Difference-in-Difference Approach, Males 
 OLS FE IV-FE RF-FE 
Log (contractual gross wage rate) -0.088*** -0.079*** -0.222*** … 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.086)  
Age 0.013*** 0.040** 0.060** 0.029 
 (0.003) (0.020) (0.025) (0.020) 
Age squared -0.018*** -0.027** -0.042*** -0.018 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) 
Years of schooling 0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Married 0.037*** -0.012 -0.003 -0.016 
 (0.012) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) 
1 or 2 children in HH 0.025** 0.032** 0.032** 0.031** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
3 or more children in HH -0.021 -0.057 -0.070 -0.050 
 (0.032) (0.067) (0.075) (0.067) 
Child <7 years old in HH  -0.017 0.000 -0.006 0.003 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Log (non-labor income) 0.008** -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Labor only source of income 0.121*** -0.003 0.022 -0.017 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.042) (0.036) 
Year = 2001 -0.017 -0.036 -0.018 -0.039 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) 
Year = 2002 0.004 -0.035 0.004 -0.049 
 (0.016) (0.039) (0.048) (0.039) 
Year = 2003 0.012 -0.039 0.010 -0.058 
 (0.016) (0.055) (0.067) (0.054) 
Year = 2004 0.013 -0.058 0.000 -0.084 
 (0.016) (0.073) (0.087) (0.070) 
Treat 0.035* … … … 
 (0.019)    
Treat × post reform dummy 0.073*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
Notes: N=8002. We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to control for arbitrary serial 
correlation; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and * significant at 10% level.  Dependent variable is 
the log of actual hours worked at primary and secondary jobs in last 30 days.  Wages and income are in constant 2000 
prices.  All specifications are estimated on the full sample (i.e, all individuals with positive labor earnings) for years 
2000–2004.  Treat is the treatment dummy (=1 if treated) defined using post reform actual earnings.  “No children” is 
the omitted category for number of children in HH.  HH denotes household.  FE is the estimator with individual fixed 
effects.  The reduced form specification (RF-FE) includes the following demand shifters: dummies for 9 categories of 
firm size (# of employees), the log of difference in regional employment, the log of difference in regional value added 
per capita, and the local employment share of foreign firms.  The demand shifters are used as instruments in the IV 
specification.  The first stage F-statistics (p-value) is 3.016 (0.001) and Hansen’s J statistics (p-value) is 11.376 (0.329). 
R2=0.056 in OLS and 0.029 in FE (within).   
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Table 3: Labor Supply Function: DID Approach, Females 
 OLS FE IV-FE RF-FE 
Log (contractual gross wage rate) -0.109*** -0.105*** -0.072 … 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.213)  
Age 0.012*** 0.016 0.013 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.025) (0.032) (0.025) 
Age squared -0.014*** -0.017 -0.013 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.033) (0.014) 
Years of schooling -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Married -0.050*** -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
1 or 2 children in HH -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
3 or more children in HH -0.104** 0.018 0.022 0.030 
 (0.048) (0.091) (0.094) (0.093) 
Child <7 years old in HH  -0.045*** -0.040** -0.039** -0.037** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) 
Log (non-labor income) 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Labor only source of income 0.038 -0.035 -0.040 -0.050 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.047) (0.039) 
Year = 2001 0.001 0.007 0.001 -0.011 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.046) (0.026) 
Year = 2002 0.027* 0.042 0.027 -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.045) (0.109) (0.046) 
Year = 2003 0.032** 0.048 0.028 -0.013 
 (0.014) (0.066) (0.141) (0.067) 
Year = 2004 0.043*** 0.056 0.032 -0.021 
 (0.014) (0.086) (0.178) (0.087) 
Treat 0.138*** … … … 
 (0.018)    
Treat × post reform dummy 0.024 0.002 -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.018) 
Notes:  N=9492.  We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to control for arbitrary serial 
correlation; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and * significant at 10% level.  Dependent variable 
is the log of actual hours worked at primary and secondary jobs in last 30 days.  Wages and income are in constant 
2000 prices.  All specifications are estimated on the full sample (i.e, all individuals with positive labor earnings) for 
years 2000–2004.  Treat is the treatment dummy (=1 if treated) defined using post reform actual earnings.  “No 
children” is the omitted category for number of children in HH.  HH denotes household.  FE is the estimator with 
individual fixed effects.  The reduced form specification (RF-FE) includes the following demand shifters: dummies for 
9 categories of firm size (# of employees), the log of difference in regional employment, the log of difference in 
regional value added per capita, and the local employment share of foreign firms.  The demand shifters are used as 
instruments in the IV specification.  The first stage F-stat (p-value) is 3.452(0.016) and Hansen’s J statistics (p-value) 
is 0.210(0.9).  R2=0.065 in OLS and 0.027 in FE (within).  
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Table 4: Labor Supply Response to Flat Tax: DID Approach, IV-FE 
 Males Females 
 Actual  
hours 
Usual  
hours 
Actual  
hours 
Usual  
hours 
Primary job 0.045** 0.031**a -0.014 0.007 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.025) (0.014) 
 [7973] [8808] [9452] [10516] 
Primary and secondary job  0.053*** 0.041***a -0.001 0.020 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.026) (0.015) 
 [8002] [8817] [9492] [10535] 
All jobs  0.067*** 0.048***a 0.002 0.025 
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.029) (0.015) 
 [8007] [8812] [9496] [10533] 
Including 1998 0.050***a 0.046***a -0.002 0.022 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.026) (0.014) 
 [10493] [11540] [12472] [13867] 
Including 2005 0.050*** 0.044***a 0.007 0.010 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.024) (0.013) 
 [9529] [10448] [11277] [12495] 
Adding district × 0.061*** 0.056*** -0.011 0.002 
year interactions (0.022) (0.016) (0.024) (0.014) 
 [8002] [8817] [9492] [10535] 
Restricted sample  0.046** 0.040***a 0.008 0.019 
 (0.020) (0.013) (0.027) (0.015) 
 [7157] [7884] [9138] [10134] 
Contractual earnings 0.056*** 0.043*** -0.002 0.014 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.026) (0.015) 
 [8195] [9063] [9659] [10786] 
 
Notes: We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to control for arbitrary serial correlation; *** 
significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and * significant at 10% level.  Number of observations is reported in 
square brackets.  All specifications include individual fixed effects and the same set of controls as in Tables 2 and 3.  
Estimation is for the years 2000–2004 unless otherwise stated.  The instruments are the same as in Tables 2 and 3.  
Dependent variables are indicated at the top of each column (in logs).  Only the estimated treatment effect is reported.  
The treatment and control groups are defined using actual earnings for the full sample unless otherwise stated.  Full 
sample is defined in notes to Table 2.  The restricted sample includes individuals earning between 4,800 and 100,000 
rubles per year.  District refers to primary sampling units (psu).  Models are estimated using hours worked at primary 
and secondary job unless otherwise stated.  The first stage F-test is statistically significant for excluded instruments in all 
specifications.  Except for estimates indicated by a, the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous is not rejected 
at 10% level.  The observed variation in the sample size is due to different samples and missing values in hours at some 
jobs. 
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Table 5: Labor Supply Response to Flat Tax: Weighted DID Approach, IV-FE 
 Males Females 
 Actual  
hours 
Usual  
hours 
Actual  
hours 
Usual  
hours 
Primary job 0.038 0.033** -0.022 -0.016 
 (0.026) (0.017) (0.028) (0.015) 
 [7906] [8733] [9415] [10459] 
Primary and secondary job  0.047* 0.037* -0.004 0.002 
 (0.028) (0.020) (0.028) (0.016) 
 [7935] [8743] [9455] [10479] 
All jobs  0.054* 0.041** -0.001 0.002 
 (0.029) (0.020) (0.029) (0.016) 
 [7940] [8738] [9459] [10477] 
Including 1998 0.041* 0.041**a 0.002 0.007 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.013) 
 [10412] [11448] [12427] [13801] 
Including 2005 0.040 0.037* 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.027) (0.020) (0.026) (0.015) 
 [9456] [10368] [11239] [12439] 
Adding district × 0.062** 0.046** 0.013 -0.010 
year interactions (0.027) (0.020) (0.032) (0.020) 
 [7935] [8743] [9455] [10479] 
Restricted sample 0.047* 0.037* -0.004 0.002 
 (0.028) (0.020) (0.028) (0.016) 
 [7154] [7880] [9137] [10133] 
Contractual earnings 0.053** 0.040** 0.009 -0.006 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.025) (0.016) 
 [8165] [9025] [9641] [10755] 
 
Notes: We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to control for arbitrary serial correlation; *** 
significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and * significant at 10% level.  Number of observations is reported in 
square brackets.  All specifications include individual fixed effects and the same set of controls as in Tables 2 and 3.  
Estimation is for the years 2000 – 2004 unless otherwise stated.  The instruments are the same as in Tables 2 and 3.  
Dependent variables are indicated at the top of each column (in logs).  Only the estimated treatment effect is reported.  
The treatment and control groups are defined using actual earnings for the full sample unless otherwise stated.  The 
restricted sample includes individuals earning between 4,800 and 100,000 rubles per year.  District refers to primary 
sampling units (psu).  Models are estimated using hours worked at primary and secondary job unless otherwise stated.  
We reject the exogeneity of the instruments in the male specifications when 2005 is included using usual hours.  The 
first stage F-test is statistically significant for excluded instruments in all specifications.  Except for estimates indicated 
by a, the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous is not rejected at 10% level.  A fewer number of 
observations in Table 5 relative to Table 4 is due to a zero weight given to the observations that are far away from the 
threshold.   
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Table 6: DID Estimates of Transitional Probabilities for Extensive Margins, Reduced Form 
 Males Females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Full sample 
A: Worked at least one hour last 0.090** 0.111*** 0.126*** 0.136*** 
month at primary job (0.037) (0.035) (0.027) (0.028) 
 [2448] [2448] [4128] [4128] 
B: Hold multiple jobs -0.008 -0.002 0.018** 0.022*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
 [5907] [6078] [7306] [7492] 
Restricted sample 
A: Worked at least one hour last 0.084** 0.108*** 0.125*** 0.136*** 
month at primary job (0.037) (0.035) (0.027) (0.028) 
 [2339] [2339] [4091] [4086] 
B: Hold multiple jobs -0.010 -0.002 0.020** 0.023*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
 [5402] [5656] [7073] [7301] 
 
Notes: We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to control for arbitrary serial correlation; *** 
significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and * significant at 10% level.  Number of observations is reported 
in square brackets.  Dependent variables are indicated in the first column (all dummies).  Reported is the effect of 
the reform on the transitional probability for each margin.  All specifications include individual fixed effects and the 
same set of variables as in Table A3.  Full sample is defined in notes to Table 2.  The restricted sample includes 
individuals earning between 4,800 and 100,000 rubles per year.  Estimation in A is for the years 2001–2004 
conditional on non-participation in 2000.  Estimation in B is for the years 2001–2004 conditional on having a single 
job in 2000.  The treatment and control groups are defined using actual earnings (models 1 and 3) and contractual 
earnings (models 2 and 4).  Labor earnings for working-age non-participants in A are predicted using gender, age, 
age squared, years of schooling, marital status, number of children, non-labor household income, regional labor 
demand shifters, and 38 dummies for municipalities.  
49 
 
Table A1: Variable Description 
Variable Name Definition
Individual Labor Supply (actual hours ha)
At primary job Hours worked last month at primary job; unusually high hours are top 
coded at 480 hours per month (16 hours per day*30 days)
At primary and secondary job  Hours worked last month at primary job + hours worked last month at 
secondary job
At all jobs Hours worked last month at primary job + hours worked last month at 
secondary job + hours spent last month on  individual economic 
activities (activities for which an individual is paid, such as sewing a 
dress, assisting with repairs, selling goods in a market or on the street, 
etc.)
Individual Labor Supply (usual hours hu)
At primary job 4 times usual hours in a typical week at primary job  
At primary and secondary job 4 times usual hours in a typical week at primary job + 4 times usual 
hours in a typical week at secondary job
At all jobs 4 times usual hours in a typical week at primary job + 4 times usual 
hours in a typical week at secondary job + hours spent last month on 
regular individual economic activities.
Individual Labor Supply (extensive margins)
Worked one hour = 1 if worked at least one hour at primary job last month (defined 
using actual hours)
Hold multiple jobs = 1 if individual had more than one job last month 
Individual Net Labor Earnings
Actual net earnings  Money received last month from primary job + money received last 
month from secondary job 
Actual net wage rate (wa) Actual net earnings divided by the corresponding actual hours.
Contractual net earnings Monthly average labor earnings from  primary job + money received 
last month from secondary job 
Contractual net wage rate (wc) Contractual net earnings divided by the respective usual hours.
Individual Gross Declared Labor Earnings
Contractual gross earnings Gross declared earnings, YG, are computed by inverting the tax 
function, T, for each year t based on reported net earnings, YN, and 
standard deductions, D: )( it
G
itt
G
it
N
it DYTYY −−= .  Similar to IKK 
(2005), we assume that earnings are received evenly throughout the 
year when inverting the tax function.
Contractual gross wage rate Contractual gross earnings divided by the respective usual hours.
Non-Labor Income
Non-labor family income Disposable household income minus own contractual labor earnings, 
where disposable household income is the sum of contractual 
earnings from all sources across all individual respondents within the 
household + imputed contractual labor earnings for working-age non-
respondents within the household + net private transfers + financial 
income received last month + public transfers. 
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Other Variables
Household composition Vector of household composition variables: 3 categories for the 
number of children 16 years old and younger (0, 1-2, and 3+) and a 
dummy for individuals with a child 7 years or younger in HH.
Married =1 if married
Age Continuous age variable.
Schooling Years of schooling
Change in regional employment Annual difference in the log of regional employment 
Change in regional value added per 
capita 
Annual difference in the log of regional value added per capita 
Local share of foreign firms Share of foreign firms in local employment (at the psu level)
Size of firm 9 categories for firm size
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Table A2: Summary Statistics for Demand Shifters  
Variables Mean Std. Deviation
Firm size categories 
1-5 employees 0.044 0.205 
 6-20 employees 0.123 0.329 
21-50 employees 0.134 0.341 
51-200 employees 0.183 0.387 
201-500 employees 0.094 0.292 
501-2000 employees 0.102 0.303 
> 2000 employees 0.053 0.225 
Self-employed with no employees 0.061 0.240 
Firm size missing 0.205 0.404 
   
Change in regional employment 0.006 0.015 
Change in regional value added per capita 0.247 0.091 
Local share of foreign firms  0.043 0.046 
Notes: N=18686. Means reported are for the period 2000-2004. The sample 
includes males and females as well as treated and controlled individuals.  Variables 
are defined in Table A1. 
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Table A3: Labor Supply Response to Flat Tax: DID Approach, Reduced Form  
 Males Females 
 Actual  
Hours 
Usual  
hours 
Actual  
hours 
Usual  
hours 
Primary job 0.044** 0.030** -0.021 -0.013 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011) 
 [7973] [8808] [9452] [10516] 
Primary and secondary job  0.051*** 0.039*** -0.007 -0.003 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) 
 [8002] [8817] [9492] [10535] 
All jobs  0.050*** 0.038*** -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) 
 [8007] [8812] [9496] [10533] 
Including 1998 0.046*** 0.039*** -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) 
 [10493] [11540] [12472] [13867] 
Including 2005 0.054*** 0.045*** -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.017) (0.011) 
 [9529] [10448] [11277] [12495] 
Adding district × 0.049** 0.046*** -0.006 0.003 
year interactions (0.021) (0.016) (0.019) (0.012) 
 [8002] [8817] [9492] [10535] 
Restricted sample 0.048** 0.039*** -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) 
 [7157] [7884] [9138] [10134] 
Contractual earnings 0.042** 0.035*** -0.002 -0.010 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011) 
 [8195] [9063] [9659] [10786] 
 
Notes: We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to control for arbitrary serial correlation; *** 
significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and * significant at 10% level.  Number of observations is reported in 
square brackets.  All specifications include individual fixed effects and the same set of controls as in Tables 2 and 3.  
Estimation is for the years 2000–2004 unless otherwise stated.  Dependent variables are indicated at the top of each 
column (in logs).  Only the estimated treatment effect is reported.  The treatment and control groups are defined using 
actual earnings for the full sample unless otherwise stated.  Full sample is defined in notes to Table 2. The restricted 
sample includes individuals earning between 4,800 and 100,000 rubles per year.  District refers to primary sampling units 
(psu).  Models are estimated using hours worked at primary and secondary job unless otherwise stated.  The observed 
variation in the sample size is due to different samples and missing values in hours at some jobs.  The number of 
observations is the same as in Table 4. 
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Table A4: Labor Supply Response at Different Thresholds, DID Approach 
 Males Females 
 Actual  
hours 
Usual 
 hours 
Actual  
hours 
Usual 
hours 
 Panel A: Reduced Form  
Upper brackets × Dp 0.047** 0.032** -0.007 -0.010 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) 
31% top bracket × Dp 0.015 0.030 0.001 0.046** 
 (0.028) (0.020) (0.043) (0.020) 
 [8002] [8817] [9492] [10535] 
 Panel B: Instrumental Variables 
Upper brackets × Dp 0.048** 0.034** -0.001 0.012 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.027) (0.015) 
31% top bracket × Dp 0.025 0.034* -0.000 0.046* 
 (0.029) (0.018) (0.043) (0.026) 
 [8002] [8817] [9492] [10535] 
 
Notes: We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to correct for arbitrary serial correlation; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Number of observations is reported in square brackets.  
Dependent variables are indicated at the top of each column (in logs).  All specifications include the same set of variables 
as in Tables 2 and 3, year and individual fixed effects, and are estimated on the full sample with actual earnings used to 
define treatment and control groups.  As with Tables 2 and 3, the demand shifters in the reduced form models are used as 
instruments in the IV specifications.  Reported are the estimated coefficients on the interaction of a post-reform dummy 
with the two upper brackets and the 31% top bracket. Dp denotes a dummy for the post-reform period.   
 
